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ABSTRACT
As deep neural networks are increasingly being deployed in prac-
tice, their efficiency has become an important issue. While there
are compression techniques for reducing the network’s size, energy
consumption and computational requirement, they only demon-
strate empirically that there is no loss of accuracy, but lack formal
guarantees of the compressed network, e.g., in the presence of
adversarial examples. Existing verification techniques such as Re-
luplex, ReluVal, and DeepPoly provide formal guarantees, but
they are designed for analyzing a single network instead of the
relationship between two networks. To fill the gap, we develop
a new method for differential verification of two closely related
networks. Our method consists of a fast but approximate forward
interval analysis pass followed by a backward pass that iteratively
refines the approximation until the desired property is verified. We
have two main innovations. During the forward pass, we exploit
structural and behavioral similarities of the two networks to more
accurately bound the difference between the output neurons of the
two networks. Then in the backward pass, we leverage the gra-
dient differences to more accurately compute the most beneficial
refinement. Our experiments show that, compared to state-of-the-
art verification tools, our method can achieve orders-of-magnitude
speedup and prove many more properties than existing tools.
1 INTRODUCTION
As deep neural networks (DNNs) make their way into safety critical
systems such as aircraft collision avoidance [17] and autonomous
driving [3], where errors may lead to catastrophes, there is a grow-
ing need for formal verification. The situation is further exacerbated
by adversarial examples [11, 42], which are security exploits cre-
ated specifically to cause erroneous classifications [22, 31, 32, 51].
There is also a growing need for reducing the size of the neural
networks deployed on energy- and computation-constrained de-
vices. Consequently, compression techniques [14] have emerged
to prune unnecessary edges, quantize the weights of remaining
edges, and retrain the networks, but they do not provide any formal
guarantee – typically the accuracy of a compressed network is only
demonstrated empirically.
While empirical evidence or statistical analysis may increase
our confidence that a network behaves as expected for most of the
inputs, they cannot prove that it does so for all inputs. Similarly,
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Figure 1: Differential verification of deep neural networks.
while heuristic search and dynamic analysis techniques, including
testing [25, 35, 43] and fuzzing [33, 49, 50], may quickly discover ad-
versarial examples, they cannot prove the absence of such examples.
At the same time, while state-of-the-art verification techniques [8–
10, 16, 19, 29, 37, 40, 44], including Reluplex [18], ReluVal [45]
andDeepPoly [39], can provide formal proofs, they are designed for
analyzing a single network as opposed to the relationship between
two networks.
In this work, we focus on differential verification of two closely
related networks. In this problem domain, we assume that f and
f ′ are two neural networks trained for the same task; that is, they
accept the same input x and are expected to produce the same out-
put. They are also structurally the same while differing only in the
numerical values of edge weights (which allows us to analyze com-
pression techniques such as quantization and edge pruning [14]).
In this context, differential verification is concerned with proving
∀x ∈ X . | f ′(x) − f (x)| < ϵ , where X is an input region of inter-
est and ϵ is some reasonably small bound. This problem has not
received adequate attention and, as we will show in this work,
existing tools are ill-suited for solving this problem.
The key limitation of existing tools is that, since they are de-
signed to analyze the behavior of a single network, they do not
have the ability to exploit the structural similarities of two closely
related networks. They also have difficulty handling the constraint
that the inputs to both f and f ′ are identical. Typically, these tools
work by computing the conservative value ranges of all neurons
from input to output in a layer-by-layer style. In the early layers,
they may be able to maintain relationships between the inputs,
but as the functions become increasingly non-linear in subsequent
layers, approximations must be made. This “eager” approximation
means relationships between the inputs of f and f ′ are mostly lost,
causing extremely large over-approximations in the output layer.
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Figure 2: The differential verification flow of ReluDiff.
In fact, state-of-the-art verification tools that we have investi-
gated (ReluVal [45] and DeepPoly [39]) struggle to verify that two
identical networks are the same. To carry out this litmus test without
drastically altering these tools, we construct a combined network
as shown in Figure 1, where f and f ′ are actually the same network
(i.e. same structure and edge weights). Since they share the same
input x , we expect f (x)− f (x) to be 0 regardless of the input region
for x . While our method can easily prove that | f (x) − f (x)| < ϵ
for an arbitrarily small ϵ in less than a second, none of the existing
tools are able to do so. In fact, DeepPoly cannot verify it no matter
how much time is given (it is not a complete method) and ReluVal
times out after several hours.
Figure 2 shows the overall flow of our method, ReluDiff, whose
input consists of the two networks (DNN1 and DNN2), an input re-
gion (x1 ∈ X1 and x2 ∈ X2), and a bound ϵ on the output difference.
There are three possible outcomes: (1) verified, meaning that the
output difference is proved to be less than ϵ ; (2) falsified, meaning a
counterexample is found; or (3) unknown, meaning that verification
remains inconclusive due to bounds on the computing resources.
Internally, ReluDiff iterates through two steps: a forward pass
and a backward pass. The forward pass computes over-approximated
value differences of corresponding neurons in the two networks,
and propagates them layer by layer from the input to the output. If
the output difference is within the region [−ϵ, ϵ], the property is
verified. Otherwise, ReluDiff samples a fixed number of concrete
examples from the input space and tests if they violate the property.
If a violation is found, the property is falsified; otherwise, ReluDiff
enters the refinement phase.
The goal of refinement is to identify an input region that should
be divided into subregions. By using these subregions to perform
the forward pass again, some of the forced over-approximations
may be avoided, thus leading to significant accuracy increase. To
identify the right input region for refinement, the backward pass
computes the difference of the gradients of the two networks and
uses it to find input regions that, once divided into subregions, are
more likely to result in accuracy increase.
While iterative interval analysis has been used in verifying neu-
ral networks before [45], the focus has always been on a single
network. In this work, we show that, by focusing on both networks
simultaneously, we can be more efficient and accurate compared
to analyzing each network in isolation. Note that, in differential
verification, the two networks have identical structures and simi-
lar behaviors; therefore, we can easily develop a correspondence
between neurons in f and f ′, thus allowing a lock-step style veri-
fication. Lock-step verification allows us to directly compute the
differences in values of neurons and propagate these differences
through edges. It also allows symbolic intervals to be used to avoid
some of the approximations. Since error caused by approximation
grows quickly, sometimes exponentially [44], as it is propagated
through edges and neurons, this can significantly increase accuracy.
When approximation must be made, e.g., due to non-linearity of
ReLU, we can handle them better by focusing on the value differ-
ences instead of the absolute values. For example, in ReluVal [45],
if a symbolic expression that represents the ReLU input may be both
positive and negative, the symbolic expression must be replaced
by an interval with concrete upper and lower bounds, which intro-
duces additional error. In contrast, we can be more accurate: even
if the input value of a neuron may be both positive and negative, in
many cases we still can avoid introducing error into the difference.
We have implemented ReluDiff in a tool and evaluated it on
a number of feed-forward neural network benchmarks, including
ACAS Xu for aircraft collision avoidance [17], MNIST for hand-
written digit recognition [24], and HAR for human activity recog-
nition [1]. We also experimentally compared ReluDiff with state-
of-the-art tools, including ReluVal [45] and DeepPoly [39]. Our
experimental results show that, in almost all cases, ReluDiff out-
performs these existing tools in both speed and accuracy. In total,
we evaluate on 842 properties over our benchmark networks. Re-
luDiff was often one to two orders-of-magnitude faster, and was
able to prove 745 out of the 842 properties whereas none of the
other tools can prove more than 413 properties.
To summarize, we make the following contributions:
• We propose the first iterative symbolic interval analysis for
differential verification of two neural networks.
• We develop a forward pass algorithm for more accurately
computing the value differences for corresponding neurons.
• We develop a backward pass algorithm, based on gradient
difference, for computing the refinement.
• We implement the method and demonstrate its advantages
over existing tools in terms of both speed and accuracy.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. First, we use
examples to motivate our method in Section 2. Then, we review the
basics of neural networks and interval analysis in Section 3. Next,
we present our method for the forward pass in Section 4, followed
by our method for the backward pass in Section 5. We present our
experimental results in Section 6. We review the related work in
Section 7. Finally, we give our conclusions in Section 8.
2 MOTIVATION
We illustrate the problems of existing verification tools using ex-
amples and then highlight our main contributions.
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Figure 3: A neural network with two inputs and one output.
2.1 Differential Verification
Figure 3 shows a feed-forward neural network with one input layer,
two hidden layers, and one output layer. The input layer has two
nodes n0,1 and n0,2, corresponding to the two input variables x1
and x2. Each hidden layer consists of two neurons, n1,1,n1,2 in one
layer and n2,1,n2,2 in the other layer. Each of these neurons has
two computation steps: the affine transformation and the ReLU
activation. For example, inside n1,1, the affine transformation is
1.9x1 − 2.1x2 and the ReLU activation ismax(0, 1.9x1 − 2.1x2). The
output layer has one node, representing the value of y = f (x1,x2).
In general, f is a non-linear function over x1 and x2.
In differential verification, we are concerned with the relation-
ship between f (x1,x2) and another network f ′(x1,x2). For the sake
of example, we focus on a network compression technique called
quantiziation [14] in which the edge weights of f are rounded to
the nearest whole number to obtain f ′. However, we note that
our method can be used on any two networks with similar struc-
tures, e.g., when f ′ is created using other techniques including edge
pruning and network retraining [14, 15, 17, 38].
These techniques, in general, raise the concern on how they
affect the network’s behavior. In particular, we would like to verify
that the new network produces outputs within some bound relative
to the original network. Formally, let f ′ : X → Y be the second
network and f : X → Y be the first network. We would like to
verify that | f ′(x) − f (x)| < ϵ for all x ∈ X , where X ⊆ X is some
region of importance in the input domain X.
2.2 Existing Approaches
Existing tools for verifying neural networks target only a single
network at a time, and are often geared toward proving the absence
of adversarial examples. That is, given an input region of interest,
they decide if the output stays in a desired region. For the network
in Figure 3, in particular, the input region may be x1 ∈ [4, 6] and
x2 ∈ [1, 5], and the desired output may be f (x1,x2) < 15. However,
these tools are not designed for verifying the relationship between
two networks. While we could try and re-use them for our purpose,
they lack the ability to exploit the similarities of the two networks.
For example, we could use the existing tool ReluVal [45] on
both f and f ′ to compare the concrete output intervals it computes
for an input region of interest, e.g., [flow , fup ] and [f ′low , f ′up ].
In order to conservatively estimate the difference between f and
f ′, we must assume the maximum difference falls in the interval
[f ′low − fup , f ′up − flow ]. In Figure 3, the interval difference would
be [−25.76, 22.93], which is too large to be useful.
Even though ReluVal could tighten the interval by refining
the input intervals, this naive approach cannot even verify that
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Figure 4: Naive differential verification of the two networks.
two identical networks always produce the same output, since the
output intervals do not capture that the corresponding inputs to f
and f ′ (i.e., values of x1 and x2) are always the same.
To compensate, we could encode the constraint that values of the
corresponding inputs are always the same by composing f and f ′
into a single feed-forward network equivalent to f ′ − f , as shown
in Figure 4. In theory, a sound and complete technique would be
able to verify, eventually, that the output difference is bounded by
an arbitrarily small ϵ , but with a caveat.
That is, to maintain the relationships between the input variables
and the difference in the outputs of the two networks, each neuron
must remain in a linear state across the entire input region; other-
wise, approximation must be made to maintain the soundness of the
interval analysis. However, approximation inevitably loses some of
the relationships between the inputs and the outputs. Indeed, we
constructed some merged networks in the same way as in Figure 4
and then fed them to existing tools. Unfortunately, they all exhibit
the “worst-case” value range blowup in the output.
The key reason is that existing tools such as ReluVal are forced
to approximate ReLU activations by concretizing, which is then
followed by interval subtractions, thus causing error introduced by
these approximations to be quickly amplified. The forward pass over
f computes an output interval of [−1.2x1−1.1x2,−1.1x1−x2+19.53],
and for f ′ it computes [−x1 − x2,−x1 − x2 + 20]. Although the
equations are symbolic, the difference [−21.36, 19.13], computed
conservatively by ReluVal, is still too large to be useful.
2.3 Our Method
Existing tools cannot exploit structural and behavioral similarities
of the two networks in differential verification. Our insight is to
leverage such similarities to drastically improve both the efficiency
and the accuracy of the verification tool.
Specifically, in this work, we pair neurons and edges of the first
network with those of the second network and then perform a lock-
step verification. This allows us to focus on the value differences
of the corresponding neurons as opposed to their absolute values.
The benefit is that doing so results in both fewer and tighter ap-
proximations and more error reduction due to the use of symbolic
3
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Figure 5: Forward interval analysis of a neural network.
intervals. We also perform better refinement by focusing on inputs
that have the greatest influence on the output difference, rather
than the absolute output values.
While focusing on the difference as opposed to absolute val-
ues seems to be a straightforward idea, there are many technical
challenges. For example, there will be significantly more complex
ReLU activation patterns to consider since we have to handle both
networks simultaneously, instead of one network at a time. Approx-
imating symbolic intervals when considering the output difference
of two ReLU activations (i.e., ReLU(x ′) - ReLU(x)) has yet to be
studied and is non-trivial. Furthermore, how to determine which
input neuron to refine when the goal is to reduce error in the output
difference between two networks has not been considered either.
In this work, we develop solutions to overcome these challenges.
During forward interval analysis, we carefully consider the ReLU
activation patterns, and propose a technique for handling each
pattern soundly while minimizing the approximation error. During
the refinement, we compute the difference between gradients of the
two networks, and use it to identify the input neuron most likely
to increase the accuracy of the differential verification result.
As a result, our method can solve the differential verification
problems much more efficiently. Consider the litmus test of veri-
fying the equivalence of two identical networks. Our method can
obtain a formal proof (that | f ′ − f | < ϵ) after performing the for-
ward interval analysis once; in contrast, all other existing tools
have failed to do so. For the example in Figure 5, we can prove the
output difference δ (n3,1) is bounded by [−0.53, 6.81] after only the
first pass. It also outperforms existing tools on other verification
problems where f ′ is obtained from f through quantization; details
of the experimental comparisons are in Section 6.
3 PRELIMINARIES
First, we review the basics of interval analysis for neural networks.
3.1 Neural Networks
We consider a neural network as a non-linear function that takes
some value in Rn as input and returns some value in Rm as output,
where n is the number of input variables andm is the number of
output variables. Let the network f be denoted f : X→ Y, where
X ⊆ Rn is the input domain and Y ⊆ Rm is the output domain. In
image recognition applications, for instance, X may be a vector of
pixels representing an image and Ymay be a vector of probabilities
for class labels. In aircraft collision detection, on the other hand, X
may be sensor data and Y may be a set of actions to take.
In this work, we consider fully-connected feed-forward networks
with rectified linear unit (ReLU) activations, which are the most
popular in practical hardware/software implementations. Thus,
y = f (x) is a series of affine transformations (e.g., x ·W1 = Σixiw1,i )
followed by point-wise ReLU (e.g., ReLU (x ·W1) =max(0,x ·W1)).
LetWk , where 1 ≤ k ≤ l , be the weight matrix associated with the
k-th layer, and l be the number of layers; the affine transformation
in the k-th layer is a standard matrix multiplication, followed by
the point-wise application of ReLU.
Formally, f = fl (fl−1(... f2(f1(x ·W1) ·W2))... ·Wl−1), where each
fk , 1 ≤ k ≤ l , is a point-wise ReLU. For the network in Figure 3,
in particular, the input is a vector x = {x1,x2}, the weight matrix
W3 = {1.0,−1.0}T , and x ·W1 = {1.9x1 − 2.1x2, 1.1x1 + 1.0x2}.
For ease of presentation, we denote the weight of the edge from
the i-th neuron of layer k−1 to the j-th neuron of layer k asWk [i, j].
We also denote the j-th neuron of layer k as nk, j .
3.2 Interval Analysis
To ensure that our analysis is over-approximated, we use interval
analysis [30], which can be viewed as a specific instantiation of
the general abstract interpretation [5] framework. Interval analysis
is well-suited for analyzing ReLU neural networks as it has well-
defined transformers over addition, subtraction, and scaling (i.e.,
multiplication by a constant).
Interval addition as denoted [a,b]+ [c,d] = [a+c,b+d] does not
lead to loss of accuracy. Scaling as denoted [a,b] ∗ c = [a ∗ c,b ∗ c]
when c ≥ 0, or [a,b] ∗ c = [b ∗ c,a ∗ c] when c < 0, does not
lead to loss of accuracy either. Interval subtraction as denoted
[a,b] − [c,d] = [a − d,b − c], however, may lead to accuracy loss.
To illustrate, consider f (x) = 2.1x and f ′(x) = 2x , and say
we want to approximate their difference for the input region x ∈
[−1, 1]. Using interval arithmetic, we would compute f ([−1, 1]) −
f ′([−1, 1]) = [−2.1, 2.1] − [−2, 2] = [−4.1, 4.1]. Clearly this is far
from the exact interval of f (x) − f ′(x) = 2.1x − 2x = 0.1x over
x ∈ [−1, 1], which is [−0.1, 0.1]. The reason for such loss of accuracy
is that, during interval arithmetic, the relationship between values
of 2.1x and 2x (i.e., they are for the same value of x ) is lost.
3.3 Symbolic Interval
One way to overcome the accuracy loss is using symbolic inter-
vals [45], which can encode the constraint that inputs to f and
f ′ are actually related. With this technique, we would use the
symbol x with the constraint x ∈ [−1, 1] to initialize the input
intervals. Then, the computation becomes f ([x ,x]) − f ′([x ,x]) =
[2.1x , 2.1x] − [2x , 2x] = [0.1x , 0.1x]. Finally, we would compute
the upper and lower bounds for x ∈ [−1, 1] and return the precise
interval [−0.1, 0.1].
Unfortunately, symbolic intervals depend on f and f ′ being
linear in the entire input region in order to be sound. Indeed, if
we add ReLU to the functions, i.e., ReLU (f (x)) =max(0, 2.1x) and
ReLU (f ′(x)) =max(0, 2x), where x ∈ [−1, 1], then the lower and
upper bounds are no longer precise nor sound. The reason is because
max(0, 2.1x) is non-linear in x ∈ [−1, 1]. Thus, we have to approx-
imate using the concrete interval [0, 2.1]. Similarly,max(0, 2x) is
approximated using [0, 2]. Thus, [0, 2.1] − [0, 2] = [−2, 2.1].
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Figure 6: Diagram of weight notations.
3.4 Refinement
To improve the accuracy of the symbolic interval analysis, we need
to divide the input region into subregions. The intuition is that,
within a smaller subregion, the ReLU is less likely to exhibit non-
linear behavior and force the analyzer to over-approximate. Con-
sider ReLU (2.1x) = max(0, 2.1x), where x ∈ [−1, 1]. After the
input region is divided into subregions x ∈ [−1, 0] ∪ [0, 1], we have
max(0, 2.1x) = [0, 0] for x ∈ [−1, 0] andmax(0, 2.1x) = [2.1x , 2.1x]
for x ∈ [0, 1]. In both cases, the intervals are precise – there is no
approximation at all.
When we only have one input variable, we do not have a choice
on which variable to refine. However, neural networks have many
inputs, and refining some of them will not always yield benefit.
Thus, we have to identify the right input to split.
Consider f (x1,x2) = ReLU (5x1)+ReLU (2x2)−ReLU (x2), where
x1 ∈ [1, 3] and x2 ∈ [−1, 1]. The initial analysis is not very accu-
rate due to approximations caused by the ReLU: ReLU (5 ∗ [1, 3]) +
ReLU (2 ∗ [−1, 1])+ReLU ([−1, 1])= ReLU ([5, 15])+ReLU ([−2, 2])+
ReLU ([−1, 1]) = [5, 15] + [0, 2] − [0, 1] = [4, 17].
If we split x1 ∈ [1, 3] into x1 ∈ [1, 2]∪ [2, 3] and perform interval
analysis for both subregions, the output would be [4, 12] ∪ [9, 17] =
[4, 17], which does not improve over the initial result.
In contrast, if we split x2 ∈ [−1, 1] into x2 ∈ [−1, 0] ∪ [0, 1], the
accuracy would improve significantly. Since the ReLU is always
activated for x2 ∈ [0, 1], ReLU (2x2) and ReLU (x2) can be repre-
sented by [2x2, 2x2] and [x2,x2], respectively, and ReLU (2x2) −
ReLU (x2) = [x2,x2] = [0, 1]. Since the ReLU is always de-activated
for x2 ∈ [−1, 0], we have ReLU (2x2) −ReLU (x2) = [0, 0]. Thus, the
combined output [5, 15] ∪ [5, 16] = [5, 16] is more accurate than the
initial approximation [4, 17].
While how to analyze non-linear activation functions such as
ReLU has been studied in prior work [19, 39, 44], none of the ex-
isting techniques touch upon the complex scenarios arising from
differential verification of two closely related networks. Our work
fills the gap. Specifically, we propose a more accurate forward pass
for the interval analysis (Section 4) and a more accurate backward
pass for the refinement (Section 5).
4 FORWARD INTERVAL ANALYSIS
In this section, we describe our forward pass for computing the
value differences between neurons in the two networks. Recall that
network f has l layers and weight matricesWk , 1 ≤ k ≤ l , and
nk, j is the j-th node in the k-th layer. Furthermore,Wk [i, j] is the
weight of the edge from nk−1,i to nk, j . We illustrate these notations
in Figure 6. Similarly, network f ′ has weight matricesW ′k , nodes
Input: network f , network f ′, input region X
Result: difference {δ (nl, j )} for output
Initialize {S (n0, j )}, {S (n′0, j )} to input region X and {δ (n0, j )} to 0
for k in 1..NLayer do
// Affine transformer
for j in 1..layerSize[k] do
S in (nk, j ) ← ∑i S (nk−1,i ) ·Wk [i, j]
S in (n′k, j ) ←
∑
i S (n′k−1,i ) ·W ′k [i, j]
δ in (nk, j ) ← ∑i (S (nk−1,i ) ·W ∆k [i, j] + δ (nk−1,i ) ·W ′k [i, j])
end
if k = NLayer then
return {δ in (nk, j )}
end
// ReLU transformer
for j in 1..layerSize[k] do
⟨S (nk, j ), S (n′k, j ), δ (nk, j )⟩ ←
ReLuTransform(S in (nk, j ), S in (n′k, j ), δ in (nk, j ))
end
end
Algorithm 1: Forward symbolic interval analysis.
n′k, j , and weightsW
′
k [i, j] . LetW ∆k [i, j] be the weight difference, i.e
W ∆k [i, j] =W ′k [i, j] −Wk [i, j].
We now define notations for the interval values of neurons. Since
each neuron nk, j has an affine transformation (multiplying by the
incoming weights) and a ReLU, we denote the input interval to the
neuron (after applying the affine transform) as Sin (nk, j ), and we
denote the output interval of the neuron (after applying the ReLU)
as S(nk, j ). We denote the interval bound on the difference between
the inputs to n′k, j and nk, j as δ
in (nk, j ), and we denote the interval
difference between the outputs as δ (nk, j ). Finally, we denote the
symbolic upper and lower bound of any value using the notation
UB
()
and LB
()
. For example, UB
(
S(nk, j )
)
and LB
(
S(nk, j )
)
denote
the symbolic upper and lower bound for the output of neuron nk, j .
With this notation, our forward pass is shown in Algorithms 1
and 2. The input consists of the two networks, f and f ′, and the
input region of interest X , which defines an interval for each in-
put neuron. After initializing the input intervals, the algorithm
iteratively computes each S(nk, j ), S(n′k, j ), and δ (nk, j ) of the sub-
sequent layer by applying the affine transformation followed by
the ReLU transformation. The algorithm iterates until the output
layer is reached. In addition, it computes the gradient masks for
the neurons of f and f ′, denoted as R and R′, which record the
state of each neuron in the forward pass ([0, 0] is inactive, [1, 1] is
active, and [0, 1] is both). These are used in the refinement phase
(Section 5) to determine which input neuron to refine.
We omit discussion of computing Sin (nk, j ) and S(nk, j ) because
it has been studied in previous work [45]. We focus on computing
δ in (nk, j ) and δ (nk, j ) in the following section.
4.1 The Affine Transformer
Computingδ in (nk, j ) involves two steps. First, we computeδ (Wk [i, j])
for each incoming edge to nk, j . Here, δ (Wk [i, j]) is the difference in
values produced by the edges from nk−1,i to nk, j and from n′k−1,i
to n′k, j . Second, we sum them to obtain δ
in (nk, j ).
In the first step, there are two components to consider when com-
puting δ (Wk [i, j]). First, there is the “new quantity” introduced by
the difference in edge weights, which formally is S(nk−1,i ) ·W ∆k [i, j].
In English, this is the interval of neuron nk−1,i in the previous layer
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multiplied by the edge weight difference in the current layer. Sec-
ond, there is the “old quantity” accumulated in previous layers
being scaled by the edge weight in the current layer. Formally this
is δ (nk−1,i ) ·W ′k [i, j]. Below we write out the formal derivation:
δ (Wk [i, j]) =W ′k [i, j] · S(n′k−1,i ) −Wk [i, j] · S(nk−1,i )
=W ′k [i, j] · S(n′k−1,i ) −Wk [i, j] · S(nk−1,i )+
(W ′k [i, j] · S(nk−1,i )−W ′k [i, j] · S(nk−1,i ))
= (W ′k [i, j] · S(n′k−1,i )−W ′k [i, j] · S(nk−1,i ))+
(W ′k [i, j] · S(nk−1,i ) −Wk [i, j] · S(nk−1,i ))
= δ (nk−1,i ) ·W ′k [i, j] + S(nk−1,i ) ·W ∆k [i, j] .
In the second step, we sum together each incoming δ (Wk [i, j])
term to obtain δ in (nk, j ), which is the difference of the values
Sin (nk, j ) and Sin (n′k, j ). That is,
δ in (nk, j ) =
∑
i
δ (Wk [i, j]) .
We demonstrate the computation on the example in Figure 5.
First, we compute δ (W1[1, 1]) = 0.1 · [4, 6]+2 · [0, 0] = [0.4, 0.6] and
δ (W1[2, 1]) = 0.1 · [1, 5] + 2 · [0, 0] = [0.1, 0.5]. Then, we compute
δ (W1[1, 2]) = [−0.6,−0.4] and δ (W1[2, 2]) = [0, 0].
Next, we compute δ in (n1,1) = δ (W1[1, 1]) + δ (W1[2, 1]) =
[0.5, 1.1] and δ in (n1,2) = δ (W1[1, 2]) + δ (W1[2, 2]) = [−0.6,−0.4].
4.2 The ReLU Transformer
Next, we apply the ReLU activation to δ in (nk, j ) to obtain δ (nk, j ).
We consider nine cases based on whether the ReLUs ofnk, j andn′k, j
are always activated, always deactivated, or non-linear. In the remain-
der of the section, we discuss how to soundly over-approximate.
Algorithm 2 shows the details.
First, we consider the three cases when the ReLU in nk, j is al-
ways deactivated. (1) If the ReLU in n′k, j is also always deactivated,
the outputs of both ReLUs are 0, and the difference is 0. (2) If
the ReLU in n′k, j is always activated, the output difference will be
Sin (n′k, j ) − [0, 0] = Sin (n′k, j ). Note that we can maintain symbolic
equations here. (3) If the ReLU in n′k, j is non-linear, the difference
will be [0,UB(Sin (n′k, j ))]. While UB(Sin (n′k, j )) is the symbolic up-
per bound of Sin (n′k, j ), UB
(
Sin (n′k, j )
)
is the concrete upper bound.
Note that since n′k, j is non-linear, we must concretize to be sound.
Next, we consider the three cases when the ReLU in nk, j is
always activated. (1) If the ReLU in n′k, j is always deactivated, the
difference is [0, 0] − Sin (nk, j ). Again, we can soundly maintain
symbolic equations. (2) If the ReLU in n′k, j is always activated, then
the difference is the same as δ in (nk, j ). (3) If the ReLU in n′k, j is non-
linear, the difference is [0,UB(Sin (n′k, j ))] − Sin (nk, j ), which is the
same as [−UB(Sin (nk, j )),UB(Sin (n′k, j )) − LB(Sin (nk, j ))]. Again,
we concretize to ensure soundness.
Third, we consider the three cases where the ReLU in nk, j is non-
linear. (1) If the ReLU in n′k, j is always deactivated, the difference is
[0, 0]−[0,UB(Sin (nk, j ))]. (2) If the ReLU in n′k, j is always activated,
the difference is Sin (n′k, j ) − [0,UB
(
Sin (nk, j )
)], which is the same
Input: value S in (nk, j ), value S in (n′k, j ), difference δ in (nk, j )
Result: value S (nk, j ), value S (n′k, j ), difference δ (nk, j )
if UB
(
S in (nk, j )
) ≤ 0 then
R[k ][j] = [0, 0]
S (nk, j ) = [0, 0]
if UB
(
S in (n′k, j )
) ≤ 0 then
R′[k][j] = [0, 0]
S (n′k, j ) = [0, 0]
δ (nk, j ) = [0, 0]
else if LB
(
S in (n′k, j )
)
> 0 then
R′[k][j] = [1, 1]
S (n′k, j ) = S in (n′k, j )
δ (nk, j ) = S in (n′k, j )
else
R′[k][j] = [0, 1]
S (n′k, j ) = [0, UB
(
S in (n′k, j )
)]
δ (n′k, j ) = [0, UB
(
S in (n′k, j )
)]
else if LB
(
S in (nk, j )
)
> 0 then
R[k ][j] = [1, 1]
S (nk, j ) = S in (nk, j )
if UB
(
S in (n′k, j )
) ≤ 0 then
R′[k][j] = [0, 0]
S (n′k, j ) = [0, 0]
δ (nk, j ) = −S in (nk, j )
else if LB
(
S in (n′k, j )
)
> 0 then
R′[k][j] = [1, 1]
S (n′k, j ) = S in (n′k, j )
δ (nk, j ) = δ in (nk, j )
else
R′[k][j] = [0, 1]
S (n′k, j ) = [0, UB
(
S in (n′k, j )
)]
δ (nk, j ) = [−UB
(
S in (nk, j )
)
, UB
(
S in (n′k, j )
) − LB(S in (nk, j ))]
Opt. 1:
δ (nk, j ) = [max
( − UB(S in (nk, j )), LB(δ in (nk, j )) ) ,
max
( − LB(S in (nk, j )), UB(δ in (nk, j )) )]
else
R[k ][j] = [0, 1]
S (nk, j ) = [0, UB
(
S in (nk, j )
)]
if UB
(
S in (n′k, j )
) ≤ 0 then
R′[k][j] = [0, 0]
S (n′k, j ) = [0, 0]
δ (nk, j ) = [−UB
(
S in (nk, j )
)
, 0]
else if LB
(
S in (n′k, j )
)
> 0 then
R′[k][j] = [1, 1]
S (n′k, j ) = S in (n′k, j )
δ (nk, j ) = [LB
(
S in (n′k, j )
) − UB(S in (nk, j )), UB(S in (n′k, j ))]
Opt. 2:
δ (nk, j ) = [min
(
LB
(
S in (n′k, j )
)
, LB
(
δ in (nk, j )
) )
,
min
(
UB
(
δ in (nk, j )
)
, UB
(
S in (n′k, j )
) )]
else
R′[k][j] = [0, 1]
S (n′k, j ) = [0, UB
(
S in (n′k, j )
)]
δ (nk, j ) = [−UB
(
S in (nk, j )
)
, UB
(
S in (n′k, j )
)]
Opt. 3:
if LB
(
δ in (nk, j )
) ≥ 0 then
δ (nk, j ) = [0, UB
(
δ in (nk, j )
)]
else if UB
(
δ in (nk, j )
) ≤ 0 then
δ (nk, j ) = [max
(
LB
(
δ in (nk, j )
)
, −UB(S in (nk, j )) ), 0]
else
δ (nk, j ) = [max
(
LB
(
δ in (nk, j )
)
, −UB(S in (nk, j )) ) ,
UB
(
S in (n′k, j )
)]
Algorithm 2: Over-approximating ReLU activation function.
as [LB(Sin (n′k, j )) − UB(Sin (nk, j )),UB(Sin (n′k, j ))]. (3) If the ReLU
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in n′k, j is also non-linear, then the difference is [0,UB
(
Sin (n′k, j )
)] −
[0,UB(Sin (nk, j ))], which is [−UB(Sin (nk, j )),UB(Sin (n′k, j ))].
4.3 Optimization
The most important optimization we make in the forward pass
when computing δ (nk, j ) is in shifting from bounding the equation
ReLU
(
Sin (n′k, j )
) − ReLU(Sin (nk, j ))
to bounding one the following equivalent equations
ReLU
(
Sin (nk, j ) + δ in (nk, j )
) − ReLU(Sin (nk, j )) (1)
ReLU
(
Sin (n′k, j )
) − ReLU(Sin (n′k, j ) − δ in (nk, j )) (2)
Equation 1 says that for any concrete nk, j ∈ Sin (nk, j ) , the most
n′k, j can change is bounded by δ
in (nk, j ), and similarly for Equa-
tion 2. As shown in Algorithm 2, we have identified three optimiza-
tion opportunities, marked as Opt.1-3. We note that, even though
we widen the difference interval in some of these cases, the interval
is almost always tighter than if we subtract the bounds of n′k, j and
nk, j , even when they are symbolic. Below, we give formal proofs
for most of the bounds, and the remaining proofs can be found in
the appendix of our arXiv paper [34].
4.3.1 Opt. 1: nk, j is active, n
′
k, j is non-linear. Using Equation 1, we
can potentially tighten the lower bound. To reduce the notation
complexity, we rewrite Equation 1 as the function:
∆(n,d) = ReLU (n + d) − ReLU (n) (3)
= ReLU (n + d) − n (4)
where n ∈ Sin (nk, j ) and d ∈ δ in (nk, j ), and we can simplify from
Equation 3 to 4 because nk, j is active. Now, computing δ (nk, j )
amounts to finding the upper and lower bounds on ∆(n,d).
Observe that if n + d ≥ 0 then ∆(n,d) = d because ReLU(n + d)
simplifies ton+d , and the like terms cancel. Otherwise ∆(n,d) = −n
because ReLU(n + d) = 0. Observing that n + d ≥ 0 = d ≥ −n, this
means ∆(n,d) is equivalent to:
∆(n,d) =
{
d d ≥ −n
−n d < −n =max(−n,d)
max() is well-defined for intervals. Specifically, for two intervals
[a,b], [c,d], we have:
max([a,b], [c,d]) = [max(a, c),max(b,d)].
Now plugging in the the bounds of n and d we get:
∆(n,d) =max
(
[−UB(Sin (nk, j )),−LB(Sin (nk, j ))],
[LB(δ in (nk, j )),UB(δ in (nk, j ))])
= [max
(
− UB(Sin (nk, j )), LB(δ in (nk, j )) ),
max
(
− LB(Sin (nk, j )),UB(δ in (nk, j )) )]
4.3.2 Opt. 2: nk, j is non-linear, n
′
k, j is active. Using Equation 2, we
can tighten the upper bound. We first rewrite Equation 2 as:
∆′(n′,d) = n′ − ReLU (n′ − d ) . (5)
Just like Equation 4, Equation 5 can be broken into two cases based
on the inequality n′−d ≥ 0 = n′ ≥ d , which gives us the piece-wise
equation:
∆′(n′,d) =
{
d n′ ≥ d
n′ n′ < d
=min(n′,d)
For two intervals [a,b], [c,d], we have
min([a,b], [c,d]) = [min(a, c),min(b,d)].
Replacing n′ and d with the proper bounds gives us the min()
function in Algorithm 2.
4.3.3 Opt. 3: both nk, j and n
′
k, j are non-linear. We consider three
cases. First, let LB
(
δ in (nk, j )
) ≥ 0. This means that n′k, j ≥ nk, j
before applying ReLU, and then we can derive 0 as a lower bound
as follows:
n′k, j ≥ nk, j =⇒ ReLU
(
n′k, j
) ≥ ReLU(nk, j )
= ReLU
(
n′k, j
) − ReLU(nk, j ) ≥ 0
In addition, UB
(
δ in (nk, j )
)
can be derived as an upper bound1 from
Equation 2 [34]. This is the case in our motivating example, so
δ (n1,1) = [0, 1.1]. Second, we consider UB
(
δ in (nk, j )
) ≤ 0. This
means n′k, j ≤ nk, j before ReLU, which allows us to derive an upper
bound of 0 in a symmetric manner to the first case. The lower bound
shown in Algorithm 2 can be derived from Equation 1 [34]. In the
third case where LB
(
δ in (nk, j )
)
< 0 < UB
(
δ in (nk, j )
)
, the lower
bound and the upper bound shown in Algorithm 2 can be derived
from Equations 1 and 2, respectively [34] (also see Footnote 1).
4.4 On the Correctness
The operations of the affine transformation are soundly defined for
intervals as described in Section 3.2. For the ReLU transformation,
we give formal explanations to show that they over-approximate
(see also [34] for proofs). Since composing over-approximations
also results in an over-approximation, the forward analysis is itself
a sound over-approximation.
5 GRADIENT BASED REFINEMENT
After performing the forward pass, the computed difference may
not be tight enough to prove the desired property. In this section,
we discuss how we can improve the analysis result.
5.1 Splitting Input Intervals
As mentioned in Section 3, a common way to improve the result
of interval analysis is dividing an input interval into disjoint sub-
intervals, and then performing interval analysis on the sub-intervals.
After unioning the output intervals, the result will be at least as
good as the original result [30]. Prior work [45] also shows a nice
property of ReLU networks: after a finite number of such splits, the
result of the interval analysis can be arbitrarily accurate.
However, determining the optimal order of refinement is difficult
and, so far, the best algorithms are all heuristic based. For example,
the method used in ReluVal chooses to split the input interval that
has the most influence on the output value. The intuition is that
1 In fact, the tighter upper boundmin(UB(δ in (nk, j )), UB(S in (n′k, j ))) can be de-
rived, however we had not yet proved this at the time of submission.
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Input: network f , mask matrix R
Result: gradient ∇
// Initialize to edge weights in the output layer
UB
(∇1 ) = LB(∇1 ) = 1
for k = l − 1..2 do
∇New = {[0, 0], . . . , [0, 0]}
for j = 1..layerSize[k ] do
// Perform ReLU for node nk, j
if R[k ][j] == [0, 0] then
LB
(∇j ) = UB(∇j ) = 0
else if R[k][j] = [0, 1] then
LB
(∇j ) =min(0, LB(∇j ))
UB
(∇j ) =max (0, UB(∇j ))
// Multiply by weights of incoming edges to node nk, j
for i = 1..layerSize[k − 1] do
ifWk [i, j] ≥ 0 then
UB
(∇Newi ) +=Wk [i, j] ∗ UB(∇j )
LB
(∇Newi ) +=Wk [i, j] ∗ LB(∇j )
else
UB
(∇Newi ) +=Wk [i, j] ∗ LB(∇j )
LB
(∇Newi ) +=Wk [i, j] ∗ UB(∇j )
end
end
∇ = ∇NEW
end
return ∇
Algorithm 3: Computing the gradient of a network.
splitting such an input interval reduces the approximation error of
the output interval.
However, the approach is not suitable in our case because we
focus on the difference between the two networks: the input interval
with the most influence on the absolute value of the output may
not have the most influence on the output difference. To account
for this difference, we develop a method for determining which
input interval to split.
5.2 The Refinement Algorithm
Our idea is to compute the difference of the gradients for the two
networks, denoted ∇δ . Toward this end, we compute the gradient
of the first network (∇) and the gradient of the second network
(∇′). Then, we use them to compute the difference ∇δ .
Formally, ∇ = {∂ f /∂x1, . . . , ∂ f /∂xn } is a vector whose i-th
element, ∇i = ∂ f /∂xi , is the partial derivative of the output f with
respect to the input xi . Similarly, ∇′ = {∂ f ′/∂x1, . . . , ∂ f ′/∂xn }.
The difference is∇δ = {∂(f ′− f )/∂x1, . . . , ∂(f ′− f )/∂xn } =∇′−∇.
That is, the derivative of a difference of functions is the difference
of their derivatives.
During interval analysis, the accurate gradient is difficult to
compute. Therefore, we compute the approximated gradient, where
each element ∇i is represented by a concrete interval.
Algorithm 3 shows our gradient computation procedure. In addi-
tion to the network, which may be either f or f ′, it also takes the
mask matrix R as input. Recall that both R[k][j] and R′[k][j] have
been computed by Algorithm 2 during the forward pass. R[k][i]
may be [0, 0], [1, 1], or [0, 1], indicating if the ReLU in nk, j is always
de-activated, always activated, or non-linear, respectively. It can be
understood as the gradient interval of the ReLU.
The gradient computation is performed backwardly beginning
at the output layer and then moving through the previous layers.
In each layer, the computation has two steps. First we apply ReLU
to the current gradient and update the upper and lower bounds of
1.1
0.5
1
-1
x1
x2
[0, 1.5]
[−0.5, 0.5]
n1
n2
n3
1.0
1.0
1
-1
Figure 7: Example for backward refinement.
the gradient if needed. Then, we scale the gradient interval by the
weights of the previous layer.
After computing ∇ and ∇′ by invoking Algorithm 3 on f and
f ′, respectively, we compute the gradient difference ∇δ .
Then, we use the gradient difference to determine which input
has the most influence on the output difference. Note that the
gradient itself is not sufficient to act as an indicator of influence.
For example, while an input’s gradient may be large, but the width
of its input interval is small, splitting it will not have much impact
on the output interval. Thus, we split the input interval with the
maximum smear value [20, 21]. The smear value of an input xi is
defined as the width of its input interval |UB(xi )−LB(xi ) | scaled by
the upper bound of its corresponding gradient difference UB
(∇δ )i .
5.3 An Example
We now walk through the gradient computation in Algorithm 3 for
the example in Figure 7, where blue weights are for network f , and
green weights are for network f ′. We focus on the gradient of f
first. After performing the forward pass, we know that n1 is in a
linear state, i.e., R[1][0] = [1, 1], and n2 is in a non-linear state, i.e.,
R[1][1] = [0, 1].
We initialize the gradient to the weights of the final layer; that
is, UB
(∇1) = LB(∇1) = 1 and UB(∇2) = LB(∇2) = −1. Next, we
apply ReLU. Since n1 is in the always activated mode, we leave
its gradient unchanged. However, n2 is in the non-linear mode,
meaning the gradient could be 0, and hence we must ensure that 0
is in the gradient interval. We update LB
(∇2) = 0. Then, we scale
the gradient interval by weights of the incoming edges, which gives
us the gradient intervals for input variables: ∇1 = [1.1, 1.1] for x1
and ∇2 = [−0.5, 0] for x2.
Here, we point out a problemwith ReluVal’s refinement method.
It would compute the smear value of x1 and x2 to be |(1.5−0)∗1.1| =
1.65 and |(0.5 − (−0.5)) ∗ −0.5| = 0.5, respectively, which means it
would split on x1. However, this is not appropriate for differential
verification, since the two networks differ the most in the weights
of the outgoing edge of x2.
Our method, instead, would compute the gradient difference
∇δ = ∇ − ∇′. Therefore, we have ∇δ1 = [−0.1,−0.1] for x1 and
∇δ2 = [−0.5, 1] for x2. Based on the new smear values, we would
choose to split the input interval of x2.
6 EXPERIMENTS
We have implemented ReluDiff and compared it experimentally
with state-of-the-art neural network verification tools. Like Re-
luVal, ReluDiff is written in C using OpenBLAS [52] as the li-
brary for matrix multiplications. We also note that we implement
outward-rounding to soundly handle floating point arithmetic. Sym-
bolic interval arithmetic is implemented usingmatrixmultiplication.
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ReluDiff takes two networks f and f ′ together with a small ϵ
and input region X as input, and then decides whether ∀x ∈ X .
| f ′(x)− f (x)| < ϵ for the target label’s value. Since ReluDiff is the
only tool currently available for differential verification of neural
networks, to facilitate the experimental comparison with existing
tools, we developed a tool to merge f and f ′ into a combined net-
work f ′′, as shown in Figure 4, before feeding f ′′ to these existing
tools as input.
6.1 Benchmarks
Our benchmarks are 49 feed-forward neural networks from three
applications: aircraft collision detection, image recognition, and
human activity recognition. We produce f ′ by truncating each
network’s weights from 32-bit floats to 16-bit floats.
6.1.1 ACAS Xu [17]. ACAS Xu is a set of 45 neural networks com-
monly used in evaluating neural network verification tools. They
are designed to be used in an aircraft to advise the pilot of what
action to take in the presence of an intruder aircraft. They each take
five inputs: distance between self and the intruder, angle of self rel-
ative to the intruder, angle of intruder relative to self, speed of self,
and speed of intruder. They output a score in the range [−0.5, 0.5]
for five different actions: clear-of-conflict, weak left, weak right,
strong left, and strong right. The action with the minimum score is
the action advised. In addition to the input and output layers, each
network has 6 hidden layers of 50 neurons each, for a total of 300
neurons. For differential verification, we use the same input ranges
as in [18, 45] as our regions of interest.
6.1.2 MNIST [24]. MNIST is a data set of labeled images of hand-
written digits that are often used as a benchmark to test image
classifiers. The images are 28x28 pixels, and each pixel has a gray-
scale value in the range [0, 255]. Neural networks trained on this
data set take in 784 inputs (one per pixel) each in the range [0, 255],
and output 10 scores, typically in the range of [−10, 10] for our
networks, for each of the 10 digits. The digit with the highest score
is the chosen classification.We use three neural networks trained on
the MNIST data set with architectures of 3x100, 2x512, and 4x1024;
that is, the networks have 3, 2, and 4 hidden layers, with layer size
100, 512, and 1024 neurons, respectively. Thus, in addition to the
input and output layers, these networks have 300, 1024, and 4096
hidden neurons, respectively. Empirical analysis shows that each
network has > 95% accuracy on hold-out test data.
6.1.3 Human Activity Recognition (HAR) [1]. HAR is a labeled data
set used to train models to recognize specific human activities based
on input from a smartphone’s accelerometer and gyroscope. Input
examples in this data set are labeled with one of six activities: walk-
ing, walking upstairs, walking downstairs, sitting, standing, and
laying down. The input data for the model are statistics computed
from a smartphone’s accelerometer and gyroscope sensor, such as
mean, median, min, max, etc. In total, 561 input statistics are com-
puted from these two sensors. Inputs to the network are normalized
to be in the range of [−1, 1]. We use a network trained on this data
set with an architecture of 1x500, meaning there is a hidden layer
with 500 neurons. The network takes the 561 inputs, and produces
a score in the range of [−20, 20] for each of the 6 outputs, one per
activity. The output with the maximum score is the classification.
Table 1: Statistics of the benchmarks: The total number of
verification problems is 842.
Name # in each network # input out
NN’s # in # out # hidden # neurons region ϵ
ACAS-ϕ1-ϕ2 45 5 5 6 * 50 300 1 0.05
ACAS-ϕ3 42 5 5 6 * 50 300 1 0.05
ACAS-ϕ4 42 5 5 6 * 50 300 1 0.05
ACAS-ϕ5-ϕ13 1 5 5 6 * 50 300 1 0.05
ACAS-ϕ14 2 5 5 6 * 50 300 1 0.05
ACAS-ϕ15 2 5 5 6 * 50 300 1 0.05
MNIST 3x100 1 784 10 3 * 100 300 200 1
MNIST 2x512 1 784 10 2 * 512 1,024 200 1
MNIST 4x1024 1 784 10 4 * 1024 4,096 200 1
HAR 1x500 1 561 6 1 * 500 500 100 0.25
Table 1 shows the statistics of these benchmarks, including the
number of input neurons, the number of output neurons, the num-
ber of hidden layers, as well as the total number of neurons in
these hidden layers. The last two columns list the experimental
parameters we used, namely the number of “regions of interest” in
the verification problems and the output ϵ we attempt to verify.
6.2 Experimental Evaluation
We want to answer the following research questions:
(1) Is ReluDiffmore efficient than existing methods in differen-
tial verification of neural networks in that it can both verify
properties faster and verify more properties in general?
(2) Is ReluDiff more accurate than existing methods in the
forward pass?
Toward this end, we directly compared ReluDiff to two state-of-
the-art verification tools: ReluVal [45] andDeepPoly [39]. Both are
designed to formally verify the absence of adversarial examples.
A comparison with Reluplex [18] was not possible since it does
not support affine hidden layers, which are necessary for analyz-
ing the combined network f ′′(x) as shown in Figure 4, however
we note that ReluVal previously has been shown to significantly
outperform Reluplex on all ACAS Xu benchmarks [45]. DeepPoly,
a followup of AI2 [10], has also been shown to outperform AI2.
We ran all experiments on a Linux server running Ubuntu 16.04,
an Intel Xeon CPU E5-2620, and 124 GB memory. Timeout is set
at 30 minutes for each verification problem. When available, we
enable parallelization in all tools and configure them to allow up to
10 threads at a time.
6.3 Results
To evaluate efficiency and accuracy, we truncate each network’s
weights from 32-bit floats to 16-bit floats, and attempt to verify the
ϵ shown in Table 1. We measure the number of properties verified
and the execution time to verify each property.
6.3.1 ACAS Xu. The results for ACAS Xu are shown in Tables 2
and 3. In Table 2, columns 1 and 2 show the input property used,
and the number of networks we verified the property on, which
are taken from [18, 45]. Columns 3-5 show the number of neural
networks for which the property was verified and undetermined
for each tool. Undetermined means that either the tool reported it
could not verify the problem (due to over-approximation), or the
timeout of 30 minutes was reached.
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Table 2: Accuracy of comparison of the three tools on ACAS.
Benchmark Verif. ReluDiff (new) ReluVal DeepPoly
problems proved undet. proved undet. proved undet.
ACAS ϕ1-ϕ2 45 28 17 7 38 0 45
ACAS ϕ3 42 42 0 24 18 6 36
ACAS ϕ4 42 42 0 34 8 2 40
ACAS ϕ5 1 1 0 0 1 0 1
ACAS ϕ6 1 1 0 1 0 0 1
ACAS ϕ7 1 0 1 0 1 0 1
ACAS ϕ8 1 0 1 0 1 0 1
ACAS ϕ9 1 1 0 0 1 0 1
ACAS ϕ10 1 1 0 1 0 0 1
ACAS ϕ11 1 1 0 0 1 0 1
ACAS ϕ12 1 0 1 0 1 0 1
ACAS ϕ13 1 1 0 1 0 0 1
ACAS ϕ14 2 2 0 0 2 0 2
ACAS ϕ15 2 2 0 0 2 0 2
Total 142 123 19 69 73 8 134
Table 3: Efficiency of ReluDiff vs. ReluVal on ACAS Xu.
Benchmark Verif. Total Time (s)
problems ReluDiff (new) ReluVal Avg. Speedup
ACAS ϕ1−−2 45 40595.6 69167.5 1.7
ACAS ϕ3 42 175.4 38414.2 ≥ 219
ACAS ϕ4 42 46.8 22159.2 ≥ 473.4
ACAS ϕ5 1 9.6 1800.0 ≥ 187.5
ACAS ϕ6 1 11.0 50.8 4.6
ACAS ϕ7 1 1800.0 1800.0 1.00
ACAS ϕ8 1 1800.0 1800.0 1.00
ACAS ϕ9 1 52.3 1800.0 ≥ 34.4
ACAS ϕ10 1 31.0 53.3 1.6
ACAS ϕ11 1 10.2 1800.0 ≥ 177.3
ACAS ϕ12 1 1800.0 1800.0 1.0
ACAS ϕ13 1 157.9 999.2 6.3
ACAS ϕ14 2 859.0 3600.0 ≥ 4.2
ACAS ϕ15 2 453.8 3600.0 ≥ 7.9
In Table 3, Columns 3-4 show the time taken by ReluDiff and
ReluVal for all problems verified. The last column shows the time
of ReluVal divided by the time of ReluDiff. For timeouts, we add
30 minutes to the total, which is why we display that the speedup is
greater than or equal to X for some properties. We omit the timing
data for DeepPoly since it cannot verify most properties.
These results emphasize the improvement that ReluDiff can
obtain in both speed and accuracy. It achieves orders of magnitude
speedups over ReluVal. For example, ReluDiff finishes the 42
networks for ϕ4 in 48.6 seconds, whereas ReluVal takes at least
more than 6 hours. Overall ReluDiff verifies 54 more problems
for which ReluVal times out, and 115 more problems for which
DeepPoly is too inaccurate to verify.
To understand why ReluDiff performs better, we plot the dis-
tribution of the depth at which each sub-interval was finally able
to be verified for ϕ4, shown in Figure 8. We can see that ReluDiff
consistently verifies sub-intervals at much shallower split depths.
We point out that the number of sub problems grows exponentially
as the split depth increases. Indeed, even though the difference
between the average depths does not seem large (about 14 for Re-
luDiff and 29 for ReluVal), ReluVal had to verify > 66 million
sub-intervals for ϕ4, whereas ReluDiff only had to verify 66K.
6.3.2 MNIST. While in ACAS Xu the input region to verify is
defined by the property, for MNIST, we must generate the input
Figure 8: ϕ4 max depth
distribution.
Figure 9: ∆-interval on
MNIST 4x1024.
Table 4: Accuracy comparison of the three tools on MNIST.
Benchmark Verif. ReluDiff (new) ReluVal DeepPoly
problems proved undet. proved undet. proved undet.
3x100-global 100 100 0 47 53 34 66
2x512-global 100 100 0 0 100 0 100
4x1024-global 100 22 78 0 100 0 100
3x100-3-pixel 100 100 0 100 0 100 0
2x512-3-pixel 100 100 0 100 0 80 20
4x1024-3-pixel 100 100 0 97 3 100 0
Table 5: Efficiency comparison of the three tools on MNIST.
Benchmark Verif. Total Time (s)
problems ReluDiff (new) ReluVal DeepPoly
3x100-global 100 29.47 95458.32 118823.09
2x512-global 100 77.83 180000.00 180000.0
4x1024-global 100 141604.53 180000.00 180000.0
3x100-3-pixel 100 23.90 32.60 163.75
2x512-3-pixel 100 79.24 715.16 37674.40
4x1024-3-pixel 100 296.59 92100.10 49042.98
region ourselves. We generate 200 input regions for MNIST using
two methods. The first method is based on global perturbation [39].
We take 100 test images, and for each one, we allow each of the
pixels to be perturbed by +/-3 gray scale units. The second method
is based on targeted pixel perturbation [12, 13]. We take the same
100 test images, and for each one, we set the range of 3 random
pixels to [0, 255], while the remaining 781 remain fixed.
We can again see in Tables 4 and 5 that ReluDiff is significantly
more accurate and efficient than both ReluVal and DeepPoly. Both
competing techniques struggle to handle global perturbations even
on the small 3x100 network, let alone the larger 2x512 and 4x1024
networks. On the other hand, ReluDiff can easily handle both the
3x100 and 2x512 networks, achieving at least 3 orders of magnitude
speedup on these networks. We also see a three orders of magni-
tude speedup on the two largest networks for our targeted-pixel
perturbation experiments.
Even though ReluDiff begins to reach its limit in the global
perturbation experiment on the largest 4x1024 network, we point
out that ReluDiff is significantly outperforming both DeepPoly
and ReluVal in the accuracy of their forward passes. Figure 9
compares the output bound verified on the first, single forward pass
of each technique. The comparison is presented as a scatter plot,
where the x-axis is the bound verified by ReluDiff, and the y-axis
is that of the competing technique.
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Table 6: Accuracy comparison of the three tools on HAR.
Benchmark Verif. ReluDiff (new) ReluVal DeepPoly
problems proved undet. proved undet. proved undet.
1x500 100 100 0 0 100 0 100
Table 7: Efficiency comparison of the three tools on HAR.
Benchmark Verif. Total Time (s)
problems ReluDiff (new) ReluVal DeepPoly
1x500 100 28.79 180000.00 180000.00
The graph shows that ReluDiff is nearly two orders of mag-
nitude more accurate than ReluVal and one order of magnitude
more than DeepPoly. The improvement over DeepPoly especially
emphasizes the promise of ReluDiff’s approach. This is because
ReluDiff is already outperforming DeepPoly, yet it uses a simpler
concretization approach during the forward pass, whereas Deep-
Poly uses a more sophisticated linear relaxation. We believe that
ReluDiff can be extended to use more accurate techniques such
as linear relaxation which would further improve the accuracy,
however we leave this as future work.
6.3.3 HAR. For HAR, we also created our verification problems
using input perturbation. We take 100 concrete test inputs, and for
each one, we allow a global perturbation of +/-0.1. The results are
summarized in Tables 6 and 7. Again, the experimental comparison
shows that ReluDiff is significantly more accurate and efficient.
6.4 Threats to Validity
Our method is designed for verifying neural networks typically
found in control applications, where the number of input signals
is not large. In this context, dividing the input region turns out
to be a very effective way of increasing the accuracy of interval
analysis. However, neural networks in different application domains
may have different characteristics. Therefore, it remains an open
problem whether bi-section of individual input intervals is always
an effective way of performing refinement.
Our method is designed for feed-forward ReLU networks. Al-
though there is no significant technical hurdle for it to be extended
to convolutional neural networks or other activation functions,
such as sigmoid, tanh and max-pool as shown recently by Singh et
al. [39], we have not evaluated the effectiveness. Specifically, linear
relaxation can be used to handle these features when it comes to
approximating non-linear behavior. While we use concretization
in ReluDiff, extending it with linear relaxation is possible [44].
However, we leave these extensions for future work.
7 RELATEDWORK
While there is a large and growing body of work on detecting ad-
versarial examples for neural networks, they are typically based
on heuristic search or other dynamic analysis techniques such as
testing [4, 26, 35, 41, 43, 47]. Although they are effective in finding
security vulnerabilities and violations of other critical properties,
we consider them as being orthogonal to formal verification. The
reason is because these techniques are geared toward finding viola-
tions, as opposed to proving the absence of violations.
Early work on formal verification of deep neural networks relies
on using SMT solvers [8, 16], or SMT solving algorithms [18, 19]
designed for efficiently reasoning about constraints from the ReLU
activation function. Along this line, a state-of-the-art tool is Relu-
plex [18]. In theory, these SMT solver based techniques can solve
the neural network verification problem in a sound and complete
fashion, i.e., returning a proof if and only if the network satisfies
the property. In practice, however, their scalability is often limited
and they may run out of time for larger networks.
Another line of work on verification of deep neural networks is
based on interval analysis, which can be more scalable than SMT
solver based techniques [45]. They compute conservative bounds
on the value ranges of the neurons and output signals for an input
region of interest. They also exploit the fact that neural networks are
Lipschitz continuous [37] to ensure that the interval analysis results
are sound. ReluVal [45] andDeepPoly [39] are two representatives,
among other similar tools [9, 10, 29, 40, 44].
In addition to formal verification, there are techniques for evalu-
ating and certifying the robustness of neural networks [2, 4, 7, 46]
or certified defense against adversarial examples [36, 48]. However,
neither they nor the existing verification techniques were designed
for differential verification of two closely related neural networks,
which is the focus of this paper. As shown by the examples in Sec-
tion 2 and the experimental results in Section 6, directly applying
these techniques to differential verification is often extremely inef-
ficient. In contrast, our method is designed specifically for solving
the differential verification problem efficiently.
At a higher level, our method relies on symbolic interval analysis,
which can be viewed as a specific form of abstract interpretation [5].
While the abstract interpretation framework allows approximations
to be performed in amore general way, e.g., using relational abstract
domains [28] such as the octagon [27] and polyhedral [6] domains,
so far, it has not be adequately explored. We plan to explore the use
of these abstract domains as part of the future work.
Finally, the term differential verification has been used in the
context of verifying a new version of a program with respect to a
previous version, which is treated as an “oracle” [23]. In a sense,
the truncated network is a “new version” of the original network,
and the original network can be thought of as an oracle.
8 CONCLUSION
We have presented a new method, named ReluDiff, for differential
verification of two closely related neural networks. It is capable
of formally proving the accuracy of a compressed network with
respect to the original network. Internally, ReluDiff relies on sym-
bolic interval analysis to more accurately compute and propagate
differences in the values of neurons of the two networks from the in-
put to the output, and then relies on the gradient difference to more
accurately compute the refinement. Our experimental comparison
of ReluDiff with state-of-the-art formal verification techniques
shows that it can often achieve two orders of magnitude speedup
and produce many more proofs.
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A OPTIMIZATION 3 PROOFS
Here we give formal proofs for the un-proven bounds in Section 4.3.
As in section 4.3, we rewrite Equations 1 and 2 as
∆(n,d) = ReLU(n + d ) − ReLU(n)
∆′(n′,d) = ReLU(n′) − ReLU(n′ − d ) .
where n ∈ Sin (nk, j ),n′ ∈ Sin (n′k, j ), and d ∈ δ in (nk, j ).
A.1 Upper Bound of First Case
Recall this case is LB
(
δ in (nk, j )
) ≥ 0. We derive the bound from
Equation 2 by dividing into two cases, and then combining their
result to get the lower bound.
Case 1: n′ − d > 0 = n′ > d
Based on the above constraint, we can simplify ∆′(n′,d) to
∆′(n′,d) = ReLU(n′) − (n′ − d).
In addition, sincewe are considering the casewhere LB
(
δ in (nk, j )
) ≥
0, we have d ≥ 0. Combining this with our case 1 constraint n′ > d ,
we have
n′ > d ∧ d ≥ 0 =⇒ n′ > 0.
Thus, in case 1, we have that ∆′(n′,d) is just
∆′(n′,d) = n′ − (n′ − d) = d .
We also note that n′ > 0 means that
n′ > d ⇐⇒ max(0,n′) > d
because n′ > 0 means thatmax(0,n′) = n′. We use this fact when
we combine the two cases.
Case 2: n′ − d ≤ 0 = n′ ≤ d
The above constraint allows us to simplify ∆′(n′,d) to
∆′(n′,d) = ReLU(n′) − 0 = ReLU(n′) =max(0,n′).
We also note that under our constraints we have
n′ ≤ d ⇐⇒ max(0,n′) ≤ d,
which we will use when we combine the cases. To prove this, first
observe that
0 ≤ d ∧ n′ ≤ d =⇒ max(0,n′) ≤ d .
That is, if d is greater-than-or-equal to both 0 and n′, then clearly
it is greater-than-or-equal to the max of the two. And for the other
way,
max(0,n′) ≤ d =⇒ n′ ≤ d .
That is, if d is greater-than-or-equal to the max of 0 and n′, then
clearly it is greater-than-or-equal to n′.
Combing the Two Cases
Combining our two cases, we get the function
∆′(n′,d) =
{
d n′ > d
max(0,n′) n′ ≤ d
and then substituting with the equations we derived at the end of
case 1 and 2, we get
∆′(n′,d) =
{
d max(0,n′) > d
max(0,n′) max(0,n′) ≤ d =min(max(0,n
′),d)
Since the upper bound of bothmin() andmax() occur when we take
the upper bounds of their input variables, we get that the upper
bound of ∆′(n′,d) is
min(max(0,UB(Sin (n′k, j ))),UB(δ in (nk, j )))
=min(UB(Sin (n′k, j )),UB(δ in (nk, j ))).
We can remove themax() function because n′k, j is non-linear, so
UB
(
Sin (n′k, j )
)
> 0.
A.2 Lower Bound of Second Case
Recall this case is UB
(
δ in (nk, j )
) ≤ 0. We derive the lower bound
from Equation 1 by dividing into two cases. The proof is symmetric
to the previous case.
Case 1: n + d > 0 = n > −d = d > −n
In this case, we can immediately simplify
∆(n,d) = n + d − ReLU(n) .
Then, since UB
(
δ in (nk, j )
) ≤ 0 implies d ≤ 0 = −d ≥ 0, we can use
our case 1 constraint n > −d to derive
n > −d ∧ −d ≥ 0 =⇒ n > 0.
Thus we can further simplify
∆(n,d) = n + d − n = d .
We also note that n > 0 = −n < 0 =⇒ min(0,−n) = −n, so we
also have
d > −n ⇐⇒ d > min(0,−n).
We use this fact when combining the two cases.
Case 2: n + d ≤ 0 = d ≤ −n
In this case, we can immediately simplify
∆(n,d) = 0 − ReLU(n) = −max(0,n) =min(0,−n).
We also not here that
d ≤ −n ∧ d ≤ 0 ⇐⇒ d ≤ min(0,−n).
We use this fact when combining the two cases.
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Combining the Cases
Combing our two cases, we get the function
∆(n,d) =
{
d d > −n
min(0,−n) d ≤ −n
and rewriting this equation using the inequalities we derived at the
end of case 1 and 2 we get
∆(n,d) =
{
d d > min(0,−n)
min(0,−n) d ≤ min(0,−n) =max(d,min(0,−n)).
Since the lower bound of both min() and max() occur when we
minimize their inputs, we get the lower bound of ∆(n,d) is
max(LB(δ in (nk, j )),min(0,−UB(Sin (nk, j ))))
=max(LB(δ in (nk, j )),−UB(Sin (nk, j ))).
We can remove the min() function because nk, j is non-linear so
−UB(Sin (nk, j )) < 0.
A.3 Lower Bound of Third Case
Recall this case is LB
(
δ in (nk, j )
)
< 0 < UB
(
δ in (nk, j )
)
. We derive
the lower bound from Equation 1. We divide into two cases and
then combine them as done previously.
Case 1: n + d > 0 = d > −n
∆(n,d) simplifies to
∆(n,d) = n + d − ReLU(n) .
We further divide into two sub-cases.
Case 1.1: n > 0
∆(n,d) further simplifies to
∆(n,d) = n + d − n = d .
Since we only care about the lower bound, observe that the lower
bound of case 1.1 occurs when we take the minimum value of d ,
which is always less than 0.
Case 1.2: n ≤ 0
∆(n,d) further simplifies to
∆(n,d) = n + d − 0 = n + d .
Observe that the lower bound cannot be less than 0 in case 1.2
because of the case 1 constraint. This means the lower bound al-
ways occurs in case 1.1, so we can safely ignore case 1.2. (But we
emphasize this only applies when evaluating ∆(n,d) for the lower
bound).
Case 2: n + d ≤ 0 = d ≤ −n
∆(n,d) further simplifies to
∆(n,d) = 0 − ReLU(n) = −ReLU(n) .
We consider the two cases of this function.
Case 2.1: n > 0
∆(n,d) becomes
∆(n,d) = −n.
The minimum value here occurs at the upper bound of n, which is
always less than 0 because nk, j is non-linear.
Case 2.2: n ≤ 0
∆(n,d) = 0 in this case. Since the lower bound of case 2.1 is always
less than 0, the minimum value will never occur in this case, so we
can safely ignore it.
Combining the Cases
We’ve shown that the minimum value occurs in either case 1.1
or case 2.1, which gives us the function (however only for the
minimum value and not the maximum)
∆(n,d) =
{
d d > −n
−n d ≤ −n =max(−n,d).
Evaluating this function for its lower bounds gives us
max(−UB(Sin (nk, j )), LB(δ in (nk, j ))).
A.4 Upper Bound of Third Case
Recall this case is LB
(
δ in (nk, j )
)
< 0 < UB
(
δ in (nk, j )
)
. We derive
the upper bound from Equation 2. We divide into two cases and
then combine them as done previously. This proof mirrors the proof
for the lower bound of the third case.
Case 1: n′ − d > 0 = n′ > d
∆′(n′,d) simplifies to
∆′(n′,d) = ReLU(n′) − n′ + d .
We further divide into two sub-cases.
Case 1.1: n′ > 0
∆′(n′,d) further simplifies to
∆′(n′,d) = n′ − n′ + d = d .
Since we only care about the upper bound, observe that the upper
bound of case 1.1 occurs when we take the maximum value of d ,
which is always greater than 0.
Case 1.2: n′ ≤ 0
∆′(n′,d) further simplifies to
∆′(n′,d) = 0 − n′ + d = −n′ + d .
Our case 1 constraint n′ − d > 0 = 0 > −n′ + d implies the upper
bound in case 1.2 can be no greater than 0. This means the upper
bound ∆′(n′,d) always occurs in case 1.1, so we can ignore case
1.2.
Case 2: n′ − d ≤ 0 = n′ ≤ d
∆′(n′,d) further simplifies to
∆′(n′,d) = ReLU(n′) − 0 = ReLU(n′) .
We consider the two cases of this function.
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Case 2.1: n′ > 0
∆′(n′,d) becomes
∆′(n′,d) = n′,
which has its maximum value at the upper bound of n′.
Case 2.2: n′ ≤ 0
∆(n,d) = 0 in this case. Since the upper bound of n′ is greater than
0, the maximum value will never occur in this case, so we can safely
ignore it.
Combining the Cases
We’ve shown that the maximum value occurs in either case 1.1 or
case 2.1, which gives us the function (only for the maximum value
and not the minimum)
∆′(n′,d) =
{
d n′ > d
n′ n′ ≤ d =min(n
′,d).
Evaluating this function for its upper bound gives us
min(UB(Sin (n′k, j )),UB(δ in (nk, j ))).
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